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GORDON C. HOLT, individually, and 
GORDON C. HOLT, dba HOLT REALTY & 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
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corporation, 
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INC., a corporation, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 
13922 
Case No. 
13922 
B R I E F OF R E S P O N D E N T S H O L T 
S T A T E M E N T O F T H E K I N D O F CASE 
This matter involves two actions relating to cer-
tain property situated in Salt Lake County, Utah, both 
of which under the ultimate pleadings resolve them-
selves into a determination as to whether or not a cer-
tain Uniform Real Estate Contract relating to said 
property had been legally and properly terminated so 
that title to the property should be quieted in the Re-
spondents Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt, or 
whether the Appellant Zion's Properties, Inc. still re-
tains an interest in the said property under and by 
virtue ofl said Uniform Real Estate Contractb. In 
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effect, under all the pleadings, cross-claims and count-
erclaims in both actions, which were consolidated in the 
Court below, the matter resolved itself into a quiet title 
action, both the Appellant Zion's Properties, Inc. and 
Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt asking that 
title be quieted in them respectively. Tandy Leather 
Company, a Respondent herein, was interested only 
in determining to whom it properly should pay rentals 
on part of the property occupied by it. 
D I S P O S I T I O N I N T H E L O W E R COURT 
The lower Court granted the Motion of Respond-
ents Forrest C. Holt and Virginia W. Holt quieting 
title in them to the said property, holding that the Uni-
form Real Estate Contract had been fully and com-
pletely terminated, cancelled and forfeited in accord-
ance with the terms thereof, and that the Holts were 
entitled to all rentals on the property from and after 
February 10, 1974, including monies deposited by 
Tandy Leather Company in Civil Case No. 218576 
(R. 64-67). From that judgment, Appellant Zion's 
Properties, Inc. appeals. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
Appellant's Statement of Facts is not in truth a 
statement of "facts" but is a statement of the conten-
tions and interpretations of Appellant. Appellant's 
Brief does not cite any page or reference to the record 
to support it and accordingly does not comply with 
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Rule 75 (p) (2) (d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure. Respondents Holt accordingly set forth the fol-
lowing Statement of Facts. 
For brevity herein, the Appellant will be referred 
to herein as "Zion's"; Respondents Forrest C. Holt 
and Virginia W. Holt will be referred to as "Holts"; 
and Respondent Tandy Leather Company will be re-
ferred to as "Tandy". 
The original record sent up from the lower Court 
was the file in Civil No. 218576 (the Tandy case) and 
reference to matters therein will be designated as "R. 
". Since such did not contain all files and plead-
ings of the consolidated cases the record was supple-
meted by transmitting the file in Civil No. 218922 (the 
Zion's case) and references to matters therein will be 
designated as "Sup. R ". 
On January 31, 1973, Forrest C. Holt and Vir-
ginia W. Holt, his wife, as seller and the Great South-
ern, Inc. as buyer, entered into a certain Uniform Real 
Estate Contract covering the property which is the 
basis of these actions. A copy of said Contract is in 
the file (Sup. R. 6-7). Zion's succeeded to the rights 
of Great Southern's interest under said Contract by an 
assignment dated July 18, 1973. Each and both of the 
consolidated actions were precipitated by a notice given 
by Gordon C. Holt as agent of the Holts dated Feb-
ruary 4, 1974, addressed to Zion's declaring the Con-
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tract to be in default and requiring performance within 
five days as required by the Contract. (R. 39 and Sup. 
R. 15). 
The Uniform Real Estate Contract involved pro-
vided for a down payment of $5,000.00 and the balance 
of $40,000.00 to be paid, $7,000.00 on or before August 
1, 1973 plus interest, and the balance of $33,000.00 to 
be paid, $7,750.00 plus interest on or before February 
1, 1974 with annual payments thereafter of $7,750.00 
plus interest on the 1st day of each February until 
paid. (Sup. R. 6). The $5,000.00 down payment was 
made but none of the other payments on the Contract 
were ever made as and when the same fell due, the only 
payments made thereafter being $1,000.00 on or about 
August 1, 1973, $5,000.00 on or about September 12, 
1973, $500.00 on or about December 7, 1973, and 
$1,000.00 on or about December 16, 1973, making a 
total of all payments of $12,500.00, and a total of 
only $7,500.00 after the initial down payment. See 
Answers to Request for Admissions (R. 48) and An-
swers to Interrogatories (R. 34). Under the terms of 
the Contract there should have been paid on or before 
August 1, 1973, after the down payment, the sum of 
$7,000.00 representing the first installment plus accrued 
interest of $1,600.00, or a total of $8,600.00, which dem-
onstrates that never at any time was Zion's current in 
its required payments. In addition thereto it was re-
quired to pay the property taxes for 1973 in the amount 
of $623.27, which it failed to pay and which Holts were 
4 
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therefore required to and did pay. (R. 36, 43, 44, 45). 
With the contract being thus in default as to pay-
ments required to be made prior to February 1, 1974, 
and the February 1, 1974 payment not having been 
made on the date due, the notice of February 4, 1974 
(R. 39) was given requiring immediate performance 
or forfeiture. No payment was ever made thereafter, 
and as shown by Replies to Request for Admissions. 
No proper and unconditional tender of any monies was 
ever made thereafter. (R. 47-52). 
The Contract was then treated by the Holts as for-
feited and terminated and the Holts advised all tenants 
that rental payments should thereafter be made to them. 
(R. 40, 41, 42). 
Respondents Holt answered Interrogatories sub-
mitted by Zion's (R. 33-38). Respondents Holt then 
submitted Requests for Admissions to Zion's on August 
7 ,1974. (R. 28). No replies thereto were made or 
served or filed within the time required by Rule 36 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and had not been so 
served when Holts filed their Motion for Summary 
Judgment on September 24, 1974, (R. 22, 23, 24) and 
hence were deemed admitted and such was one of the 
bases for the Motion for Summary Judgment. Replies 
to such Request for Admissions were eventually filed 
on October 1, 1974, almost one month delinquent but 
were in the files when the Motion for Summary Judg-
5 
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ment was argued. (R. 47-53). Such replies and the ad-
missions therein, even as qualified therein, establish that 
the Contract was always in default and that no valid 
tender or tenders were ever made prior to the termin-
ation of the Contract nor at all. (R. 47-53). 
P O I N T I 
T H E L O W E R COURT P R O P E R L Y GRANT-
E D T H E MOTION O F R E S P O N D E N T S H O L T 
F O R SUMMARY J U D G M E N T U N D E R T H E 
U N D I S P U T E D M A T E R I A L F A C T S A N D AD-
MISSIONS AS S H O W N BY T H E R E C O R D 
B E F O R E T H E COURT. 
Respondents will consider under this heading their 
arguments and answer to the arguments of the Ap-
pellant under its Points I and I I I , inasmuch as such 
matters are so inter-related that they cannot be sep-
arately discussed without undue overlapping and dup-
lication. 
I t was admitted that Holts did use a portion of 
the property involved for storage of some of Holts' 
personal property from the date of the contract, with 
the prior approval of the original purchaser, and that 
said property was left in said premises until the term-
ination of the contract. (R. 37). This, however, was 
not and could not under the law be a justification for 
the failure and refusal of the Appellant Zion's to make 
6 
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the payments required to be made under the terms of 
the contract. 
As is reflected by the files and records referred 
to in the Statement of Facts hereinabove set forth, 
from the moment the first payment, subsequent to the 
down payment, became due under the contract, the 
buyers were in default. The first payment of $7,000.00 
plus interest at 8% per annum amounting to $1,600.00 
became due under the contract on August 1, 1973. That 
payment was not made, but only $1,000.00 was paid on 
that date. I t would appear that the balance of the 
August 1, 1973 payment was extended to September 
1, 1973, but that balance was not paid. (R. 46). The 
only payments made subsequent to the initial down 
payment were $1,000.00 paid on August 1, 1973, 
$5,000.00 on or about September 12, 1973, $500.00 on 
or about December 7, 1973, and $1,000.00 on or about 
December 16,1973. 
Under the Contract after the down payment there 
was a balance of $40,000.00 due and payable as set 
forth therein. If the payment had been made as re-
quired by the Contract on August 1, 1973, both as to 
principal and interest, there should have been then re-
maining $33,000.00 on principal. In fact, however, 
after applying payments made to that date there re-
mained unpaid as of August 1, 1973, $40,600.00, and 
after the payment of $5,000.00 on September 12, 1973, 
7 
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there remained due and owing $35,978.96 including in-
terest. (Sup R. 26). Thus the Contract was at that 
time delinquent approximately $3,000.00. After apply-
ing each and every payment which was made, as the 
same were made, as above set forth, the Contract was 
at all times in default to and including February 1, 
1974, when the next payment of $7,750.00 plus in-
terest became due, which incidentally was not paid. 
See Affidavit with calculations attached thereto (Sup. 
R. 25, 26) attached to Holts' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, (Sup. R. 22) which Affidavit and figures 
were never in any respect denied or refuted, but are 
in fact completely admitted (a) by the failure of 
Zion's to timely reply to Holts' Requests for Admis-
sions, (R. 28-30), and also even by Zion's belated and 
delinquent Replies to Requests for Admissions (R. 47, 
48). In this state of affairs Holts called into play 
Section 16A of the Uniform Real Estate Contract re-
lating to defaults (Sup. R. 7) and gave notice that un-
less the entire delinquency as referred to above, plus 
an amount of $623.27 for 1974 taxes, which Zion's was 
required to pay but did not pay, were paid and the 
Contract brought current within 5 days of such notice 
of February 4, 1974, that the Contract would be term-
inated and that the seller would refuse to deliver title 
under the Contract or to recognize said Contract. (R. 
39) The Contract was not so brought current within 
said 5 day period nor at all. (See Request for Admis-
sions, R. 28-31, Zion's belated Replies thereto, R. 47-
52, and Answers to Interrogatories, R. 33-37.) 
8 
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Appellant has argued in its Brief that its default 
was cured by various claimed tenders of payments, and 
refers to such claimed tenders in its Statement of Facts 
and by reference occasionally in its Argument. Some 
of the contentions as relates to such purported tenders 
refer to the fact that such tenders were made to one 
Sterling Weber, whom Appellant refers to as "Res-
pondents' agent". Mr. Weber was not Respondents' 
agent. There is nothing in any record or pleading or 
document which was before the Court to indicate that 
Weber was Respondents' agent. As a matter of fact 
the only thing referring to Weber's relationship to any 
party is the statement contained in Appellant's belated 
Replies to Holts' Request for Admissions wherein Ap-
pellant states "Also, Sterling Weber on behalf of Zion's 
Properties, Inc. has requested that such removal occur." 
(R. 48). 
The record before the Court shows conclusively 
that never at any time was there any actual tender made 
of any monies to the Respondents Holt, and even if we 
accept at full value the contentions of Appellant as 
it relates them in its belated Replies to Requests for 
Admissions, there never was any unconditional tender 
of any funds or amounts whatsoever to any person, 
even including the said Sterling Weber, who, as in-
dicated, if he represented anyone, represented the Ap-
pellant. Weber's only connection at all with the Res-
pondents Holt was that he was the real estate agent 
who intially handled the sale of the property. 
9 
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Let us then examine the four purported tenders 
to which Appellant refers in its Brief and we will see 
that if we accept its admissions to Holts' Request for 
Admissions at full value (although not filed timely), 
the most they show are promises to make a tender, or 
conditional tenders, and even then, not timely. 
The purported "First Tender" claimed to have 
been made is referred to in the belated Replies to Re-
quest for Admissions (R. 51). Therein Appellant, 
through its officer, states " I made a verbal promise and 
tender to pay whatever amount it took to bring all 
payments current as of that date in accordance with a 
written contract and the verbal and written modifica-
tions; I was prepared to write a check out for the 
amount from my bank account but did not do so because 
the property was not removed." That surely was not an 
unconditional tender nor any tender at all, but only a 
"promise" to make a tender. 
The purported "Second Tender" is likewise re-
ferred to in said belated Replies to Request for Ad-
missions (R .51). Appellant states that on or about 
February 4, 1974 Richard Brown, for and on behalf 
of Appellant, "stated that he wanted to make the pay-
ment on the property but wanted Forrest C. Holt to 
remove his property from the subject premises". I t is 
then stated that Mr. Brown "offered to make pay-
ment". There is nothing therein nor anywhere else in 
any matter before the Court to show that money of 
10 
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any kind in the form of cash, check or otherwise was 
offered or tendered to the Respondents Holt or any-
one on their behalf. 
With regard to the purported "Third Tender", this 
was allegedly made on or about February 19, 1974 (R. 
51). Note that this was long after the Contract had 
in fact been fully and completely terminated, so that 
such purported tender can have no bearing upon the 
matter. Yet even so, it was not a tender. I t is stated 
that Mr. Brown, for and on behalf of the Appellant, 
displayed to Mr. Weber, who as indicated did not rep-
resent Holts, "the stub of a cashier's check made out to 
Forrest C. Holt in the amount of $9,765.00" and refers 
to Exhibit " B " attached. (R. 52). Note that said Ex-
hibit " B " (R. 56) shows that such cashier's check was 
in fact not used and was cashed by the purhaser on 
February 22,1974. In any event, there is no contention 
that such was ever tendered to Respondents Holt. 
As relates to the purported "Fourth Tender", this 
allegedly was made on or about March 6, 1974, again 
long after the Uniform Real Estate Contract had been 
fully and completely terminated and cancelled. The 
Appellant Zion's contends that it met again with the 
said Sterling G. Weber and "had $10,000.00 in cash 
to pay to Mr. Holt, I showed the money to Mr. Weber 
and told him that as soon as Mr. Holt had the property 
removed I would pay him that cash." Again as relates 
to this purported tender, in addition to being well after 
11 
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the Contract had been terminated, it was completely 
conditional and was never made to the Holts or anyone 
o their behalf, and in fact was not even made to the 
said Sterling Weber, but the only contention being that 
cash was showed to the said Weber. 
The purported third tender and fourth tender are 
obviously those referred to in the Reply to Holts' Re-
quest for Admissions No. 2(a) wherein Zion's admits 
that they made no payments other than those referred 
to in said Request for Admissions. (R. 48). That an-
swer states, "Admitted, except that an additional pay-
ment was tendered and refused. That payment was in 
the amount of $10,000.00 and was tendered in cash in 
the early part of April, 1974 and later in March the 
tender was renewed in the form of a cashier's check" 
* * * "the tender was conditional upon Forrest Holt's 
removing his property and possessions from the ware-
house on the subject property". (R. 48) Hence here 
again they refer to the tenders as being conditional but 
likewise also refer to the fact that said conditional tend-
ers were made after the Contract had been fully and 
completely terminated by reason of the default of the 
Appellant and purchasers in making payments under 
the Contract as and when the same became due. 
I t will therefore be observed that nowhere in any 
record, document or pleading before the Court is there 
anything to show that actual money in any form was 
ever actually tendered to the Respondents Holt to bring 
12 
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the Contract current or pay the defaulted amounts due. 
The most that is contended is that the Appellant "of-
fered" or "promised" to make a tender under certain 
conditions. There is no dispute, and in fact Appellant 
emphasizes the fact that whatever purported tenders 
were made were conditional upon Holt removing certain 
personal property from the premises, but no actual 
money ever was tendered to anyone, conditionally or 
otherwise, until long after the Contract was terminated. 
At that time Appellant claims that in March and April, 
one or two months after the Contract was terminated, 
it displayed to one Sterling Weber in one instance a 
cashier's check and in another instance certain actual 
cash and stated that such sum would be tendered in 
payment of the delinquency if the property was re-
moved. Obviously no tender made after the Contract 
had been terminated has any force or effect whatsover, 
even if it were a good tender, and as indicated, Weber 
was not Holts' representative or agent. 
The fact that Holt had left some of his property 
on the premises would not justify in any event Zion's 
from keeping these payments on the Contract current. 
Zion's had other remedies to which they could resort 
if they saw fit. I t could either remove the property or 
could put Holt on notice that a specific rental would 
be charged to him for the space occupied. Zion's could 
not, however, simply elect to make no payments, with-
out being in default and thus bring into effet the de-
fault provisions of the Contract, namely Section 16-A 
13 
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thereof and it surely could not ignore the notice of de-
fault without forfeiting its rights under the contract. 
This Court has established the rule that a tenant, 
and a fortiori a conditional buyer, cannot avoid a for-
feiture wherein the tenant or the buyer is in default, 
by a claim of an unliquidated or disputed counterclaim. 
See King v. Firm, 285 P.2d 1114, 3 Utah 2d 419. The 
Court therein quoted with approval from Volume 3, 
Williston on Contracts, Rev. Ed., Sec. 887F as follows: 
". . . Where rent is due under a lease, the ten-
ant must pay the rent even though he has been 
obliged to spend money on repairs which the 
landlord has covenanted to make. I t is true that 
if sued for rent he would in most jurisdictions 
now be allowed to recoup or counterclaim the 
damages due from the landlord, but the landlord 
may not merely sue for the rent. If the lease or 
statute, as is usually the case, allows a landlord 
to eject a tenant for non-payment of his rent, the 
landlord may pursue this remedy, and it cannot 
be said that the tenant has paid or tendered the 
rent due if he has deducted even a valid cross-
claim. So rights may be lost under a conditional 
sale or a mortgage by nonpayment though the 
creditor owes the debtor on another account a 
greater amount than that due him!' 
The Utah Supreme Court then stated: 
"Thus under some circumstances a tenant 
would be required to pay the rent or lose his 
rights to the property under the lease although 
the landlord owed him more money than the 
amount of the rent!' 
14 
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See also Bennion v. Amos, 28 Utah 2d 216, 500 P.2d 
512 (1972) wherein this Court held that affirmative 
defenses and the existence of a counter-claim, one of 
which was a contention that defendants were deprived 
of quiet enjoyment, would not preclude summary judg-
ment or stay or prevent foreclosure of the mortgage 
on the property involved. 
Again the rule is well established that conditional 
tenders are the same as no tender at all. In 52 Am. 
Jur., Tender, §24 it is stated: 
"I t is the universal rule that a tender upon con-
ditions for which there is no foundation within 
the contractual relation between the parties is 
ineffective, or as sometimes expressed, a tender 
must be without condition to which the creditor 
can have a valid objection or which will be pre-
judiial to his rights." 
Also, in addition to the requirement that the tender 
must be actually made and must be a good tender, it 
must be kept good. See Sieverts v. White, 273 P.2d 
974, 2 Utah 2d 351. 
I t has long been held by this Court that parties to 
a conditional sales contract are bound by the terms 
thereof and that full effect will be given to the terms 
thereof, including forfeitures, and particularly where 
the contract provides that time is of the essence. Among 
the cases so holding are the following: Sieverts v. 
White, supra.; Christy v. Guild, 121 P.2d 401, 101 
15 
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Utah 313; Russell v. Harkness, 4 Utah 197, 7 P.865, 
affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United States 
in 118 U.S. 663, 7 S. Ct. 51, 30 L.Ed. 285; Hirsch v. 
Steele, 10 Utah 18, 36 P.49; Detroit Heating <§ Light-
ing Co. v. Stevens, 16 Utah 177, 52 P.379; Lippincott 
v. Rich, 19 Utah 140, 56 P . 806; Standard Steam Laun-
dry v. Dole, 22 Utah 311, 61 P . 1103; Freed Furniture 
$ Carpet Co. v. Sorensen, 28 Utah 419, 79 P.564, 107 
Am .St. Rep. 731, 3 Ann. Cas. 634; Truitt v. Patten, 
Sheriff (Utah) 287 P . 175. 
Where, as here, time is of the essence, not even 
equity can relieve the vendee of his default. See Land-
field v. Cohen (Calif.) 200 P.2d 149; also Sieverts v. 
White and Christy v. Guild, supra. 
P O I N T I I 
T H E P U R P O R T E D A G R E E M E N T AS R E -
L A T E D TO A P A R T I A L P A Y M E N T N O T E D 
ON T H E C H E C K O F D E C E M B E R 10, 1973 
H A D NO V A L I D F O R C E OR E F F E C T , AS 
T H E SAME, E V E N I F E S T A B L I S H E D , W A S 
W I T H O U T C O N S I D E R A T I O N . 
Appellant's Argument No. I I centers around a 
puz'ported part performance based upon a purported 
agreement or notation referred to on a check dated De-
cember 10, 1973. I t is stated that Appellant and Res-
pondents orally agreed to payments of a lesser amount 
than that required by the Contract on December 8, 
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1973, and that in conformance with such purported 
agreement the Appellant drew its check on December 
10, 1973 in the amount of $500.00. It is stated that 
such check bears the notation "As per agreement 12-8-
73". This is one of the payments admittedly made on 
the Contract, but made when the Contract was badly 
in default and did not in any regard bring it current. 
Even if we should assume that on the date men-
tioned, it was agreed that if Zion's made a payment of 
$500.00 that further time would be given in which to 
make the additional delinquent payments, such agree-
ment was in no way binding because obviously there 
was not any consideration therefor. Zion's was obli-
gated to make all the payments which were due under 
the Contract prior to and at that time. By making the 
$500.00 payment, Zion's did not agree to and did not 
do anything which they were not already bound by the 
Uniform Real Estate Contract to do. As a matter of 
fact, all they did or agreed to do was less than they 
were already required under the Contract to do, and no 
additional benefit of any kind was received by Holts 
by virtue thereof. Again, it is a uniform rule that there 
must be a valid and good consideration for any sec-
ondary or substiuted agreement. The rule is well stated 
in 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, §460 as follows: 
u§460. Consideration for secondary or substi-
tuted agreement—necessity. 
In the absence of a statute to the contrary, a 
new agreement by the parties to an older one, 
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altering, canceling, supplementing, or supplant-
ing their former compact, in order to be valid, 
requires some consideration. Where a written 
contract is, by a later contract, altered or modi-
fied in some of its terms, the later contract must 
generally be founded on some valid consideration. 
Also, a consideration is generally necessary for 
an agreement to discharge a debt or claim for 
damages for breach of contract. An agreement 
by one person to discharge another from the ob-
ligations of a written contract as a matter purely 
ex gratia and in the nature of a donation would 
be of no binding validity as a mere executory 
agreement." 
SUMMARY 
To briefly summarize, the Appelant Zion's was, 
from the moment the first payment became due under 
the Contract, delinquent in its payments both of prin-
cipal, interest, and taxes. No valid tender was ever 
made of money in any form to bring the Contract 
curret prior to the notice of default and the taking 
effect of such notice, thereby terminating the Contract; 
furthermore, no valid tender even subsequent to the 
termination of the Contract was ever made or presented 
to the Respondents Holt. The Contract thereby being 
in default and having thereupon been properly term-
inated and cancelled after proper notice in accordance 
with the terms of said Contract, the Motion of Res-
pondents Holt for Summary Judgment was properly 
granted by the Court below. 
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CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that there was no basis for 
any ruling of the Court other than that which was 
made, namely for judgment in favor of the Respond-
ents Holt and that the said Summary Judgment 
entered by the Court below was proper and should in 
all respects be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ZAR E. H A Y E S 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents Holt 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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